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DVB-I specific security
Host: Jon Piesing Reporter: Jon Piesing Session goal: To identify and understand security issues that are specific to DVB-I
Summary of discussion:
- One security issue specific to DVB-I would be someone breaking into a service list server & modifying a service list to be malevolent, e.g. to add a linked application on every service that does a denial of service attack. It needs to be possible to remove this without asking users to re-install their DVB-I clients.
- We could compare this to injecting code in NPM. Could silently infect without being noticed. May be able to check how they handle security.
- Need to pay attention to the contribution workflow although less serious than hacking the SLR server (as HTTP cache-control would not be modified).
- DVB-I end points should not import anything they do not understand.
- The general approach to ensuring metadata belongs to correct origin is signing.
- DVB-I services may be more attractive than other targets – if it’s the live media from all the European broadcasters then this is an attractive target.
- We need to assume that any solution will divert attackers to somewhere else.
- What about post-quantum security?
- Don’t see a need for DVB to setup or sponsor a PKI.
- In Germany, there is an initiative to operate a new PKI system.
- Rules would still be needed to be decide who can get a certificate, how to address disputes, arbitration and so on.
- What about C2PA? Can that authenticate metadata?
- With plug and charge in the automotive industry, client side certificates got really complex.
- What about smaller or community service lists?
- Signing could not be mandatory.
- What is the target vector?
- Signing things may have lead times.
- Scaling up something like the security in Freely to a European scale could be really complex.
- Maybe DVB cannot solve this in the specification.
- We should provide a means to force re-discovery.
- SLR operators need measures in place to protect their security and validate contributions.
- EBU recommendation for critical IT infrastructure are a starting point.
- What would an attacker achieve by hacking a guide data server? Kudos? Reputational damage to the DVB-I system, loss of trust among the public?
- They could replace a most watched channel.
- What if there’s a persistent player?
- Could the service list move to the cloud?
- What is the DVB-I specific thing? Distribution chains / contribution chains are different.
Next steps:
Make a list of things that could be hacked, what the risk would be if they were hacked, how is responsible for securing them, how to recover if hacked.
Are there global PKI systems available that could easily be applied to DVB-I?
Can C2PA secure metadata? Is it too heavy for DVB?
Ranjeet will make a slide on possible architectural changes we could consider.